«Non chiedete cosa possa fare la FED per i mercati: chiedete cosa possono fare i mercati per la FED»

Cosenza (Italy), 8 Novembre 2010

Le ultime dichiarazioni del Presidente della FED Ben Bernanke hanno rivelato di lui un carattere duro ed intransigente, certamente non in sintonia con il prestigio internazionale e la fama di cui gode come economista e come professore universitario.

Il "Pensiero Bernanke" è in fondo il seguente: io ho ricevuto il mandato di mantenere inflazione stabile e disoccupazione bassa, ed a questo mandato voglio attenermi ad ogni costo poichè la mia unica preoccupazione è l'economia USA e non quella del resto del mondo.

Non è un caso che a seguito del nuovo programma di quantitative easing della FED si stia osservando sui mercati:

1. Aumento del prezzo dei future e del prezzo delle materie prime (vedi Reuters 8/11 "Crude oil steady to higher on U.S. economic data": "The U.S. central bank said it would buy $75 billion in Treasury bonds per month through mid-2011, totaling around $600 billion, to boost the nation's economy. The stimulus news propelled crude oil to a two-year intra-day high of $87.43 a barrel on Friday, the highest intra-day price since hitting $89.82 on October 9, 2008, surpassing this year's previous peak of $87.15 on May 3");
2. Aumento del rendimento richiesto dagli investitori sui titoli del debito pubblico di paesi europei (vedi Bloomberg 8/11 "Irish Fight to End Bond ‘Buyers Strike’ as EU Examines Budget": "Ireland will try to win support this week from the European Union to avoid a Greek-style bailout as investors balk at buying the country’s bonds. [...]. While Ireland has the funds to avert the need for an immediate rescue, its cash may run out in the middle of next year unless it can raise money from the bond market in 2011. Ireland led a surge in the cost of insuring sovereign debt to a record on Nov. 5 as the government struggles to convince investors it won’t be the next Greece, whose economy was rescued by the EU and International Monetary Fund in May. [...]. The extra yield that investors demand to hold the country’s debt rather than German bunds has more than doubled in the last three months. The difference in yield, or spread, between Irish bonds and benchmark German bunds has gone up by 100 basis points to 521 basis points, according to Bloomberg generic data".
3. Aumento dei rischi di eccessivo afflusso di capitali esteri nelle economie emergenti (vedi Reuters 8/11 "China official frets over U.S. quantitative easing": "The latest U.S. moves to lift its economy by injecting an extra $600 billion into its banking system is a shock to global financial markets and may lead to excessive flows of capital into emerging markets, Chinese Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao said on Monday. Zhu, speaking to reporters ahead of this week's G20 and APEC meetings, added that it plans "frank discussions" with the United States over its latest round of printing money. The United States must recognize its role and responsibility in the global economy, Zhu added";
4. Si parla apertamente di riaprire il dibattito su possibile un ritorno del "Gold Standard", cioè tassi di cambio fissi ancorati all'oro [per come da me segnalato già mesi addietro rifacendomi al cosiddetto modello "impossible trinity", ndr] (vedi Financial Times 8/11 "World Bank Chief Seeks Gold Standard Debate": "Leading economies should consider readopting a modified global gold standard to guide currency movements, argues the president of the World Bank. Writing in the Financial Times, Robert Zoellick, the bank’s president since 2007, says a successor is needed to what he calls the “Bretton Woods II” system of floating currencies that has held since the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime broke down in 1971. Mr Zoellick, a former US Treasury official, calls for a system that “is likely to need to involve the dollar, the euro, the yen, the pound and a renminbi that moves towards internationalization and then an open capital account”. He adds: “The system should also consider employing gold as an international reference point of market expectations about inflation, deflation and future currency values.” His views reflect disquiet with the international system, where persistent Chinese intervention to hold down the renminbi is blamed by the US and others for contributing to global current account imbalances and creating capital markets distortions. This week’s meeting of government heads in South Korea is likely to see yet more exchange rate conflict. A US plan for countries to sign up to current account targets has run into widespread opposition".

Il "Pensiero Bernanke" sta creando molto imbarazzo (non solo nel mondo economico) tanto è vero che per ben tre volte Bernanke è dovuto intervenire per difendersi pubblicamente, come ricorda il recente articolo Bloomberg del 7 Novembre "Bernanke Invokes Friedman’s Legacy in Defense of New Stimulus": "Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke invoked the inflation-fighting legacy of the late Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman and, for the third time in as many days, defended the Fed’s expansion of record stimulus. Bernanke, speaking yesterday at a conference in Jekyll Island, Georgia, responded to criticism in an opinion article this week by Allan Meltzer, a Fed historian. Meltzer said in the Wall Street Journal that Friedman, who died in 2006 and influenced the thinking of Fed officials such as Bernanke, wouldn’t have supported the central bank’s decision to buy more assets. “We are doing everything Milton Friedman would have us do,” Bernanke said. “What Milton Friedman would say is that the Federal Reserve is responsible for the stability of nominal aggregates including prices, and that means that particularly with respect to inflation, you don’t want inflation to be too high but you also don’t want it to be too low.” The Fed chief’s comments extend a defense of the Nov. 3 decision to buy $600 billion of Treasuries through June in a bid to lower unemployment and avert deflation. Officials in Germany, China and Brazil said his plan to pump cash into the banking system will jar other economies and fail to fuel U.S. growth, while U.S. critics including Meltzer say the central bank risks setting off uncontrollable inflation".

Tra i più recenti critici al "Pensiero Bernanke" vi è l'eminente storico dell'economia Allan Meltzer della Carnegie Mellon University, il quale in un'intervista a Bloomberg del 4 novembre ha affermato che tutto ciò che la FED sta compiendo unilaterlamente nel tentativo di ridurre l'inflazione è la stessa politica che negli anni 1970 e seguenti ha portato alla creazione di elevata inflazione e di peggior disoccupazione. Per questo motivo - aggiunge Meltzer - il Premio Nobel Milton Friedman (il cui pensiero è popolarissimo negli USA e ha ancora tantissima influenza nella FED) non avrebbe mai approvato questo comportamento, poichè nel risolvere un problema immediato di disoccupazione creando inflazione, si crea un problema di maggiore disoccupazione futura (vedi qui l'intervista completa in inglese).

Per maggiori dettagli sulle ragioni addotte dal Prof. Meltzer rinvio inoltre al seguente articolo del Wall Street Journal del 27 Gennaio 2010 "The Fed's Anti-Inflation Exit Strategy Will Fail": "Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has explained his exit strategy to prevent future inflation. The Fed recently began to pay interest to banks on the reserves they hold in their vaults. Using this new tool, it claims the ability to get banks to keep the money instead of lending it out, thus containing the money supply and inflation. I don't believe this will work, and no one else should.

The exit strategy is incomplete. Proponents are guilty of practicing economics without prices. They never say what the interest rate on reserves must be to get banks to hold the approximately $1 trillion of reserves above the minimum they're legally required to hold. That's the critical question. The efforts to reduce inflation during the 1970s failed because they ended prematurely. And they ended prematurely when business, unions, Congress and the administration objected loudly to the rising unemployment accompanying higher interest rates. Today's high current and prospective unemployment rates pose a similar dilemma.

No economist doubts that the Fed can induce banks to hold some more reserves by paying interest. But how much?

Normally, banks' principal business is lending, and the interest rate they can get on their loans is more important than the interest they might get on their reserves. Once borrowing resumes, banks will increase loans and expand deposits. The current massive volume of excess reserves will melt into a greater money supply, and later higher inflation.

When will inflation start? The date is uncertain. But the triggering event will be either a sustained increase in bank lending or a large increase in Fed purchases of government debt. Perhaps both. Either one would trigger a sustained increase in money growth.

With the exception of the early years after Paul Volcker became Fed chairman in 1979, the Fed has paid no attention to money growth. There have always been some Fed bank presidents concerned about too much or too little money growth, but they have not affected decisions. That problem remains.

The Federal Reserve has a well-known dual mandate to prevent both inflation and unemployment. It chooses to act on only one part of its mandate at a time. That cannot be the best way to achieve both targets, and it has failed repeatedly to bring low inflation and low unemployment. For example, the policy implied by the famous Phillips Curve—which says you can trade off higher inflation for lower unemployment—failed in the 1970s. We got rising inflation and higher unemployment.

Mr. Volcker publicly and privately discarded the Phillips Curve in favor of bringing inflation down by high interest rates and better control of the money supply. The result: about 15 years of low inflation and low unemployment. But the Fed abandoned its success by keeping interest rates too low after 2003. And now the Phillips Curve is back in fashion, with strong support from the Fed Board of Governors.

Christina Romer, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, reminds us regularly about the Fed and the Treasury's tight-money mistakes in 1937 which aborted the recovery, and she warns against repeating these mistakes. The principle drivers behind the recovery in 1934-36 were the veterans' bonus in 1936 and a gold inflow following the 1934 devaluation of the dollar—accomplished by unilaterally raising the gold price. The bonus ended, and the Treasury began to sterilize gold inflows in 1937 by selling securities, while the Fed doubled reserve requirements. Monetary policy shifted from excessive ease to excessive restraint.

Nothing of the kind is called for today. Instead, the Fed should announce a policy for preventing inflation that reduces the enormous stock of excess reserves, such as by selling securities. And the Treasury or the Office of Management and Budget should announce a credible policy for reducing deficits. That would help to reduce the uncertainty about future taxes, spending and inflation.

Policies without prices hide the serious problem posed by excessive debt and reserves, and are not credible. Policy makers should develop and announce credible plans now.

Mr. Meltzer is a professor at the Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, and the author of "A History of the Federal Reserve" (Chicago, 2003 and 2010)".

AGGIORNAMENTI

 

8 Novembre 2010: I giornalisti di Reuters si dicono "sorpresi" dall'annuncio del Presidente della Banca Mondiale Robert Zoellick di cominciare a pensare ad un ritorno del "gold standard"...evidentemente non leggono ancora LEAF (vedi Reuters "World Bank chief surprises with gold standard idea": "Leading economies should consider adopting a modified global gold standard to guide currency rates, World Bank president Robert Zoellick said on Monday in a surprise proposal before a potentially acrimonious G20 summit. Writing in the Financial Times, Zoellick called for a "Bretton Woods II" system of floating currencies as a successor to the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange rate regime that broke down in the early 1970s. The former U.S. trade representative, who served in several Republican administrations, said such a move "is likely to need to involve the dollar, the euro, the yen, the pound and (a yuan) that moves toward internationalization and then an open capital account. "The system should also consider employing gold as an international reference point of market expectations about inflation, deflation and future currency values," he added. [...]. China and Germany, major exporting nations, have both decried the Fed's quantitative easing -- effectively printing money -- which is weakening the dollar. Investors are pumping dollars into emerging markets in search of higher yields, and the potentially destabilizing impact of this, along with big current account deficits and surpluses as well as China's reluctance to let the yuan appreciate faster, are set to dominate the G20 debate. France, which takes over the G20 chair after this week's summit, says it plans to work on a new international monetary system to bring greater currency stability. Beijing's central bank chief has suggested an alternative monetary system based on using the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights, a notional unit of value based on a basket of major currencies, instead of the dollar as the sole global reserve currency. [...]. Zoellick said a new monetary system would take time to develop and should be part of a package approach including possible changes in IMF rules to review capital as well as current account policies, and linking IMF monetary assessments to World Trade Organisation obligations. The dollar rose sharply on Monday as unwinding of dollar short positions that began with solid U.S. jobs data snowballed, pushing down the euro to its lowest level since the Fed embarked on fresh easing last week. (Reporting by Lewa Pardomuan, Nick Trevethan and Paul Taylor; Editing by Ruth Pitchford)").
Matteo Olivieri
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